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Truth-in-Testing Legislation: A Brief for the
Status Quo
"[Elmpirid psychology," wrote Kant in 1786, "does not
rise to the rank of a natural science because mathematics cannot
be applied to the phenomena of inner sense . . . ."I Later philosophers have taken a kinder view of the status of psychology:
but the difficulty of arriving a t numerical descriptors of the
mind persists.
Measuring the mind is the job of the psychometrician, who
uses instruments commonly called tests. His testing is evaluated
according to its "validity," which in the jargon of the profession
refers to the accuracy of the tests as measuring instruments; a
test that measures what it purports to measure is said to be
valid.' The scores of a perfectly valid test correlate exactly with
the levels of whatever psychological phenomenon is being
measured.'
However, as Kant intimated, perfectly valid tests are an
ideal rather than a reality. Validity rarely exceeds 0.60 (where
one equals perfect validity): and in practice, levels of validity
are considerably lower. Among college admission tests: for example, median validity coefficients range from 0.41 for the Scho1. I. KANT, METAPHYSISCHE
ANFANGSGR~NDE
DER NATUPWISSENSCHAFT
(Riga 1786).
2. See, e.g., P. DESING,PALTERNS
OF DISCOVERY
IN THE SOCUL
SCIENCES
(1971); A.
KAPLAN,THE CONDUCT
OF INQUIRY (1964).
THE DEVELOPMENT,
USE, AND ABUSEOF EDUCATIONAL
TESTS131 (1979);
3. E. BURNS,
R. EBEL,ESSENTIALS
OF EDUCATIONAL
MEII~UREMENT
567 (1972).
4. A number of common criticisms of testing are included within the concept of
validity. For example, the allegation that test resulta correlate with the race or family
income of the test taker is really a validity question. A test that actually measures race
or family income when it is designed to measure other factors is invalid unless there is an
external correlation, independent of the test, between race or family income and any
qualities validly measured by the test.
Similarly, the recent findings of the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM.,
EFFECTSOF COACHING
ON STANDARDIZED
ADMISSION
EXAMINATIONS
(1979), to the effect
that pre-test "cramming" improves performance on the testa is also a validity problem. A
test is supposed to measure certain long-term learning abilities not susceptible to cramming. Thus, if testa are vulnerable to cramming, they are less valid measures of the longterm abilities they seek to assess.
5. L. CRONBACH,
E~SENTIUS
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING 135 (3d ed. 1970).
6. As used in this Comment, the word "college" is to be understood in a broad sense
and includes graduate, law, medical, and dental schools as well as undergraduate
institutions.
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lastic Aptitude Test to 0.29 for the Graduate Management Admission Test.'
Despite their imperfect validity, however, tests are used as a
basis for making important decisions. Tests largely determine
which students are placed in programs for the mentally retarded,' which are denied diplomas due to their "functional illite r a ~ y , "and
~ which are to be admitted to college, graduate study,
or professional school. Tests are also used in deciding who may
enter a certain profession or be employed at a certain job. Thus,
to a great degree, testing charts one's course through life. At
every decisive point in our educational system, a test appears
either to direct a student toward further education and a more
promising profession or to shunt him into a career requiring less
education.
Using partially invalid tests to determine whether educational opportunities will be granted causes these opportunities
to be unjustifiably withheld from some.1° For example, there are
undoubtedly students who are refused admission to the colleges
they prefer because their test scores are inaccurately low, even
though the same studenta would have been welcomed at the
same institutions had their scores more accurately reflected their
abilities.
This is a problem that is rightfully the subject of concern. It
is manifestly unfair to deny an individual an opportunity because of a test's misrepresentation of his abilities. Legislatures
have shared this concern which has been reflected in the "truth7. The median validity coefficient of the Scholastic Aptitude Test is 0.41; that of the
Graduate Record Examination is 0.33; those of the Law School Admission Test and
Graduate Management Admission Test are 0.36 and 0.29 respectively. These figures
show the degree of correlation between test scores and the abilities to be measured. 1.0
represents a perfect, positive correlation, 0.0 no correlation, and -1.0 a perfect negative
TESTING
SERVICE,
TESTUSE AND VALIDITY
16 (1980).
correlation. EDUCATIONAL
8. See Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon, No. 74 C 3586 (N.D. Ill.
July 7, 1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 475 (D.D.C. 1967), a f d sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (methods
of classifying students as emotionally disturbed violated federally guaranteed rights).
Fla. 1979). See gener9. See, e.g., Debra P . v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D.
ally Clague, Competency Testing and Potential Constitutional Challenges of "Every
StudentJJ,28 CATH.U.L. REV. 469 (1979); Lewis,Certifying Functional Literacy: Competency Testing and Implications for Due Rocess and Equal Educational Opportunity, 8
J.L. & EDUC.145 (1979).
10. Employment testing that discriminates against minorities has been the subject
of considerable litigation. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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in-testing" legislation recently enacted in California and New
York.ll Similar statutues are under consideration in a number of
other states." Nevertheless, even though a problem undeniably
exists, there is good reason to doubt that legislation will be more
effective than the status quo in solving it. This Comment will
explore the various legislative possibilities in the testing area
and compare them with present efforts to improve testing.

Like much other consumer-oriented legislation, the New
York statute uses disclosure as a means of effecting reform.lS It
contains two separate disclosure provisions. The first requires
that a testing company send a requesting test taker a copy of his
raw score, his answer sheet, and a list of correct answers.14 The
11. CAL.EDUC.CODE55 99150-99160 (Deering Supp. 1980); N.Y. EDUC.LAW$8 340347 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Although test scores are used as criteria in making a
number of crucial decisions in the course of a test taker's life, the New York and California statutes deal with only one of these decisions: college admission. Query whether this
limitation is defensible in light of the fact that the validity of all testing is imperfect,
regardless of the use to which is is put. Has college admission testing been singled out for
legislative treatment because it is more important than testing which can classify an .
individual as being mentally retarded or functionally illiterate?
12. Letter from Allan Nairn to Alan Asay, (Sept. 16, 1980). The states listed by
Nairn as considering truth-in-testing legislation are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The bills before the U.S. House of Representatives are H.R.
3564, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and H.R.4949,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). As of this
writing, both bills are still pending before the Committee on Education and Labor. The
last action taken by the committee was a hearing commenced on July 31, 1979. [1979(CCH) 11 35,017, 35,030.
19801 2 CONG.INDEX
13. The New York statute is the most imitated truth-in-testing statute, and will
therefore be discussed in this Comment as .typical. See Robertson, Examining the Examiners: The Trend Toward Truth in Testing, 9 J.L. & b u c . 167,180-84 (1980). However,
the California statute differs from its New York counterpart in that it attempts to make
testing companies more financially responsible. CAL.EDUC.CODE5 99154 (Deering Supp.
1980).
14. The relevant portions of the New York law provide:
2. Within ninety days after filing a standardized test pursuant to subdivision one of this section and for a period of not less than ninety days after the
offer is made, the test agency shall provide to the test subject the opportunity
to secure:
a. a copy of the test questions used to calculate the test subject's raw
score;
b. a copy of the test subject's answer sheet, or answer record where there is
no answer sheet, together with a copy of the correct answer sheet to the same
test with questions used to calculate the test subject's raw score so marked;
and
c. a statement of the raw score used to calculate the scores reported to the

.

+

.
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second provision requires that a test company file with a government agency a list of questions used in scoring, the accompanying correct answers, and "any study, evaluation, or statistical report pertaining to a test."16 The documents thus filed become
public records accessible under freedom of information laws?
The statute neither provides aggrieved test takers a cause of action nor establishes any regulatory authority over the testing industry; rather, it relies solely on disclosure to accomplish its
objective.
A. Disclosure to the Test Taker Identifying the Consumer

The rationale underlying disclosure laws is that an informed
consumer can better his lot in the marketplace because a competitive market offers several alternatives, which, when combined with accurate information, enable a consumer to select the
option most advantageous to him. Certain information is difficult to obtain, however, and so it is sometimes necessary to resort to a governmental mandate to force disclosure in order to
give the consumer an informed choice and thereby restore a
healthy degree of competition to the market.'' Accordingly,
lenders who are required to disclose actual interest rates and
other hidden costs in lending agreements theoretically put the
borrower in the position to choose the most favorable terms he
can find, which in turn gives lenders an incentive to make their
test subject.
N.Y. EDUC.LAW8 342(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
15. The pertinent provisions of the New York law state:
1. Within thirty days after the results of any standardized test are released, the test agency shall file or cause to be filed in the office of the
commissioner;
a. a copy of all test questions used in calculating the test subject's raw
score;
b. the corresponding acceptable answers to those questions; and
c. all rules for converting raw scores into those scores reported to the test
subject together with an explanation of such rules.

....

7. Documents submitted to the commissioner pursuant to this section shall
be public records . . . .
N.Y. EDUC.LAW 8 342(1), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
16. The New York freedom of information law is N.Y. PUB. OFF.LAW88 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
17. R. POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF THE LAW 273-76 (2d ed. 1977); Rhoades,
Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and its Effect, 20 ANTITRUST
BULL.309
(1975).
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terms more favorable.le
The New York law apparently assumes that the test taker is
the consumer in the admissions testing situation since disclosure
is directed to him. I t is more accurate, however, to view the college using the test in its admission process as the consumer. It is
true that the test taker pays for the test,'@but he has little use
for the test scores. Although he is naturally interested in any
assessment of himself, he does not take the test to gain greater
self-understanding but rather to gain entry into college. The college exercises consumer decisionmaking power inasmuch as it is
the college that decides which test, if any, it will use in its admission program." The college chooses in the market without
permitting the test taker to question the choice made." Thus,
the college is the consumer, the testing company is the seller,
and the test taker is merely a third party whose measurement is
the commodity bought and sold.
Since the test taker has little opportunity to comment about
what goes on between the college and the testing company, disclosure of information to the test taker has little effect on the
test's validity. In directing disclosure to the test taker, the New
York statute serves to inform someone who cannot act on the
information provided. Although the test taker may learn by disclosure that he has been invalidly tested, he remains powerless
to improve the validity of the test.
18. See 15 U.S.C. $8 1601-1681 (1976). However, the practical effect of the truth-inlending law has been disappointing, especially in connection with low-income consumers.
R. POSNER,
supra note 17, a t 275; Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.1 (1969); Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in
Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400.
19. Someone must bear the cost of an admissions program, and the college has no
alternative but to charge the applicant. I t would not be fair to expect students who have
already been admitted to bankroll the applications of prospective students, especially
those who are never admitted. Alumni and state governments also have little interest in
financing the comparatively mundane admissions process.
20. This market choice could not be made by the test taker because allowing him to
choose from among several testa would force the college to accept the results of any of
the test he might select. Such a practice would make it impossible to compare different
candidates since the testa not only employ different scoring scales but may also measure
different abilities.
21. See DePina v. Educational Testing Serv., 31 A.D.2d 744, 297 N.Y.S.2d 472
(1969); K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 87 Misc. 2d 657, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct.
1976). Here again, one would not have it any other way. Since the college, not the test
taker, is the primary user of the measurement, the test taker should not be the one to
determine how he is to be measured. To give the test taker control over the measurement procedure would amount to giving him control over one of the criteria of his own
admission, a matter in which he has considerable personal interest.
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On the other hand, colleges are in a position to improve
validity. They are already organized into groups for testing purposes, such as the College Board or the Law School Admissions
Council. The typical contract between a college group and the
testing company provides for development and administration of
the test by the company but leaves ownership of the test in the
college group, which also retains the right to set general testing
policy and determine what the testing company will be paid.22
Therefore, by acting collectively as owners of the test, they contract for the administration, scoring, and development of their
test according to their specifications. The testing company is induced to cooperate because a contract for testing services could
be awarded to any of several c o m p a n i e ~ . ~ ~
An example of the control a college group wields over its
test is found in the creation of the new Medical College Admission Test (MCAT). Medical colleges decided to revise the old
MCAT, and in consultation with practitioners, other interested
parties, and testing experts appointed by the colleges, they developed an entirely new test. The colleges initiated and carried
out the revision, retaining the testing companies in an advisory
role only.24
There is no evidence that the testing experts hoodwinked
the learned doctors or that a governmental disclosure mandate
would have been of any assistance to the medical colleges. Disclosure law theory presumes an ignorant or gullible consumer at
the mercy of a seller with superior knowledge, but in the case of
college admission testing, the theory does not apply. The college
22. The property rights of colleges in their tests are currently the subject of litigation arising out of the New York statute. In January, 1980, the Association of American
Medical Colleges, which administers the Medical College Admission Test, was granted a
preliminary injunction against application of the statute because of possible infringement or preemption by the Federal Copyright Act. Association of Am. Medical Colleges
v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
Colleges are already organized as groups of test users and bargain collectively with
test companies. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Law School Admission Council and
Educational Testing Service (July 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Agreement] reprinted in
Truth in Testing Act of 1979: The Educational Testing Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R.
3564 and H.R. 4949 Before the Sumcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
23. The nation's largest publishers of standardized educational tests are Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich Co.; McGraw-Hill Co.; IBM; Educational Testing Service (ETS);
Houghton Mifflin Co. In addition, there are many smaller companies in the testing busiEDUCATIONAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING33-69 (1972).
ness. M. HOLMEN& R. DOCTER,
24. Hearings, supra note 22, a t 70-77 (statement of John Cooper).
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groups are not gullible, and if they lack information, they possess the resources to obtain it since they control the spending of
the fees obtained from test takers.26Thus, the colleges, as consumers of testing, do not require the forced disclosure that
might be needed in the case of a poorly educated applicant for a
revolving charge account. Moreover, test companies have no incentive to deceive the colleges. The test company stands only to
gain from efforts to develop a more valid test, and there is no
reason to believe that they would not cooperate fully with the
colleges' efforts to do so. Consequently, since colleges are the
consumers of admission testing, it does not follow that disclosure by the testing company to the colleges needs to be required
by statute.

B. Disclosure of Test Research
The second disclosure provision of the New York statute requires testing companies to make public their research on testing. However, this provision is of little value to the colleges,
whose strong bargaining position already gives them ample access to the companies' research. Their contracts with the testing
companies require timely reporting to the colleges of all relevant
However, the New York statute's second disclosure
provision does not direct disclosure exclusively to the collegeconsumer; rather, the entire public is made the object of disclosure. Apparently this provision dispenses altogether with the
usual rationale for disclosure laws. Since disclosure is not directed to any identified consumer group but rather to the public
as a whole, the rationale cannot be a matter of rectifying defects
in the market structure. Instead, the purpose of the second provision seems to be to subject the testing establishment to
whatever public criticism may be aroused through exposure of
its research, with the hope that such criticism will give testers an
incentive to test better?'
Any incentive that might thus be gained, however, is damp25. Agreement, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. Robertson, supra note 13, at 198-99. However, it is doubtful that the statute, as
it stands, has enough teeth in it to bring about the disclosure it seeks. The statute, which
calls for disclosure of "any study
. pertaining to a test," is vague, and no regulations
have been promulgated to specify more adequately what must be disclosed. Testers are
therefore free to launder their reports, delete unfavorable findings, and even to delete
the data and submit only bald conclusions.

..
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ened by the fact that the tests' lack of validity is an open secret.
It is common knowledge that the tests are partially invalid, and
testing companies readily admit as much." Since the disclosure
of research about test invalidity will not reveal anything really
new, it cannot create a significantly greater incentive than already exists.2s
Moreover, the colleges already have a strong incentive to
improve testing. All major colleges make substantial efforts to
recruit the best young scholars. It is in their interest to identify
the most desirable prospective students by the most accurate
means. In turning away good students because of invalid scores,
both the college and the students suffer loss. In fact, the college's loss is compounded by the f a d that poor students with
invalid high scores are admitted where they would otherwise be
screened out. The need to use valid criteria to assemble the most
capable student body possible is a powerful incentive to improve
testing. Adding the threat of public embarrassment as an incentive where a strong incentive already exists amounts to using
two whips where one would do.

Because the colleges have both the power and the incentive
to improve test validity, they can be relied upon to produce the
desired improvement. The legislatures in New York and California, however, deemed their own involvement to be necessary as
well. Although their disclosure enactments will not be effective
in solving the validity problem, the question remains whether a
different legislative approach might be effective.

A. Prohibition of Admission Testing
Since the partial invalidity of college admission tests causes
unfairness, one could argue that they should be prohibited.
0

28. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL
TESTINGSERVICE,
1980-81 LAWSCHOOL
ADMISSION
BULLETIN 14-15 (1980); EDUCATIONAL
TESTING
SERVICE,
GRE INFORMATION
BULLETIN
1980-81, at
17-18 (1980); EDUCATIONAL
TESTING
SERVICE,
GRE INFORMATION
BULLETIN
1979-80, at 1314 (1979); EDUCATIONAL
TESTINGSERVICE,
GMAT BULLETIN
OF INFORMATION
1980-81, at
14-15 (1980).
29. However, it would undoubtedly be possible to compile the disclosed information
into a highly inflammatory expose, which would provide incentive by means of public
embarrassment. But the process of making inflammatory the already known fact that
test scores are partially invalid would necessitate so much distortion as to make the project of dubious social value.

910

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

However, a prohibition of admission testing would cause more
injustice than it would remedy. Test scores, when combined with
an applicant's previous grade point average, are the most valid
indicator of the applicant's future academic performance that
.~~
test scores are admittedly
has yet been d e v e l ~ p e d Although
partially invalid, they are still a more valid criterion than any
currently available replacement. If a legislature were to prohibit
the use of test scores, it would only force colleges to use less
valid criteria, resulting in even more injustice than presently exists. Thus, prohibition of admission testing is not a desirable solution despite the partial invalidity of admission tests.

B. Legal Standards for Testing
Short of an outright prohibition, it would be possible to put
more teeth in truth-in-testing statutes than the present disclosure provisions afford. This intermediate approach would probably require setting a legal standard for test validity. For example, the legislature could determine an acceptable standard of
validity for college admission testing or delegate the task of
making such a determination to a regulatory agency.s1
However, for such a standard to be more than rhetorical an
enforcement mechanism capable of imposing sanctions would
have to be provided. Sanctions would create serious drawbacks,
however, for they interfere with the most valid, presently available criterion for making college admission decisions. Fines or
damages would deprive testers of funds that could otherwise be
used to improve the tests. An injunction or cease-and-desist order would amount to a prohibition and would also cut off any
funds that would be gained from the fees of test takers. Thus,
the imposition of sanctions necessary to enforce a legal standard
for validity would not only interfere with use of the fairest admission criterion available but would also hobble the efforts of
the status quo toward developing a more valid criterion.
Moreover, sanctions are unnecessary. Colleges already have
an incentive to improve test validity as much and as quickly as
possible. Legislative efforts to accomplish the same goal would
be superfluous, if not completely counterproductive.
30. EDUCATIONAL
TESTING
SERVICE,
TESTUSEAND VALIDITY
16-19 (1980).
31. Alternatively, by setting no standard but creating a cause of action for aggrieved
test takers, the legislature could leave the business of standard setting to the courts.
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In summary, the partial invalidity of current college admission tests is a serious problem, but New York's attempt to remedy it through disclosure legislation is ineffective. Efforts to put
more teeth in the law, such as a categorical prohibition or a legal
standard with sanctions for noncompliance would only aggravate
the situation. Moreover, such efforts are unnecessary since the
colleges as owners and users of the tests have the power and incentive to bring about the desired improvements as rapidly as
they can be achieved.
However, it is important for colleges, legislatures, and their
critics to remember than not all problems are readily soluble, if
soluble at all. Our efforts to describe the mind by a simple set of
numbers may suffer from some very fundamental limitations, as
Kant believed. The quixotic search for improvements in this
area may not yield great practical results, and in the end we may
have to content ourselves with the best we have been able to
produce, even though it may be far from ideal.

Alan B. Asay

